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OVERVIEW OF THE TAUM SAUK PUMPED STORAGE POWER 
PLANT UPPER RESERVOIR FAILURE, REYNOLDS COUNTY, MO 
 
J. David Rogers     Conor M. Watkins     
Missouri University of Science & Technology Missouri University of Science & Technology 




The Taum Sauk Pumped Storage Powerplant was constructed between 1960-63 to store water for generation during peak daytime 
power demands.  The plant consists of a lower reservoir, which is sited along the East Fork of the Black River, and an upper reservoir, 
formed by a kidney-shaped rockfill dike approximately 70 to 90 ft high, capped by a 10 ft concrete parapet wall.  The upper reservoir 
held 1.5 billion gallons (~4,600 acre-feet) when filled. 
A variety of design/construction flaws, instrumentation error, and human errors contributed to a catastrophic failure of the upper 
reservoir on Dec 14, 2005.  Malfunctioning and improperly programmed/placed sensors failed to indicate that the reservoir was full 
and didn’t shut down the facility’s pumps until water had been overflowing for 5-6 minutes.  This overflow undermined the parapet 
wall and scoured the underlying embankment, leading to a complete failure within ~5-6 minutes.  The peak flow from this event is 




In 1953 Union Electric began considering construction of a 
pumped storage facility to generate electrical power during 
peak usage periods, which was a relatively new concept at that 
time.  The pumped storage scheme had the advantage of being 
able to operate at full power almost immediately, allowing the 
owner to postpone construction of a much larger steam plant 
by harnessing some of the company’s off peak power.  
Construction of the lower and upper storage reservoirs was 
authorized for the Taum Sauk site in December 1959 
(Gamble, 1960), and operations began in 1963. 
 
Although other sites were considered, the St. Francois 
Mountains of southeast Missouri was selected.  The rugged 
topographic relief provided the required head for the efficient 
operation of a pumped storage power plant and favorable 
geology was conducive to the construction of the needed 
reservoirs.  The final selection of a location for the facility, 
named the Taum Sauk Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Power 
Plant, was chosen along the East Fork of the Black River and 
atop Proffit Mountain near Annapolis, MO in Reynolds 
County about 5 miles from Taum Sauk Mountain, the highest 
point in the state.  Proffit Mountain is the 6th highest point in 
Missouri and provides around 800 feet of elevation differential 








The St. Francois Mountain region is a geologically unique 
area forming Missouri’s oldest geologic province.  During the 
Precambrian time (>1,500 Ma) igneous granite rock formed 
due to volcanic eruptions and intrusions of magma (Unklesbay 
and Vineyard, 1992). Volcanoes erupted large quantities of 
ashy pyroclastic flows and rhyolitic lava.  Thick layers of 
pyroclastic materials were deposited throughout the region as 
either air fall tuff or ash flow tuff.  Residual heat from the 
eruptions often melted or “welded” the pyroclastic ash 
fragments together and cooled to form a steel-hard igneous 
rock known as welded tuff or ignimbrite.  Most of the ash flow 
tuff present in the Proffit Mountain region is reddish in color 
and of felsic, or rhyolitic composition.  Various rhyolites and 
tuffs have a cumulative thickness of several thousand feet in 
the St. Francois Mountains.  Large bodies of reddish to 
grayish granite formed when magma cooled slowly within 
upper portions of the earth’s crust. 
 
After the decrease and eventual halt of volcanic activity during 
the Precambrian time, the area was subjected to the uplift of 
the Ozark dome (Unklesbay and Vineyard, 1992).  This uplift 
exposed the igneous knobs and ridges common to the St. 
Francois Mountains of today.  When the Cambrian seas began 
to rise, much the region was blanketed by water, leaving the 
igneous knobs and ridges as highpoints or islands.  Deposition 
of sedimentary rocks during this time left thick layers of 
sandstones and dolomites on the sea floor and draped layers of 
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the same material on the slopes of the igneous highpoints and 
knobs. 
 
Regression of the Cambrian seas exposed the younger 
sedimentary deposits and the igneous highpoints.  Erosion of 
the Cambrian strata cut new drainage patterns.  In some 
places, these drainage patterns were cut through sedimentary 
deposits down to steep igneous ridges preserved in the 
subsurface.  The modern drainage pattern formed without 
regard to the underlying Precambrian terrain, which resists the 
effects of weathering and erosion to a greater degree than the 
younger, softer sedimentary rocks.  When rivers cut down into 
these ancient bedrock ridges, their flow is locally restricted, 
forming steep, closed in chutes and potholes called shut-ins.  
Johnson Shut-Ins on the East Fork of the Black River is an 
example of this type of feature and is located below the Upper 
Taum Sauk Reservoir.  As with the most of the Ozark Plateau, 
the St. Francois Mountains were not glaciated during the 
Pleistocene.  This preserved many ancient, deeply weathered 
zones of bedrock and soil which are present throughout the 
region. 
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The Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir is located on Proffit 
Mountain, a highpoint that remained exposed during the rise 
of the Cambrian seas.  The top of the mountain is comprised 
mainly of what is known as Taum Sauk Rhyolite.  During 
construction of the Upper Reservoir, much of the mountain 
top was blasted off, with the material, mainly broken Taum 
Sauk Rhyolite, being used to construct the Upper Reservoir’s 
rock-fill dike: 
 
The Taum Sauk Rhyolite is a red to dark 
maroon ash flow tuff containing up to 30 
percent phenocrysts of alkali feldspar and 
quartz; fiamme may or may not be present.  
The formation is widely exposed in the 
Proffit-Wildcat-Taum Sauk mountain area.  
Although its maximum thickness has not 
been established, it is greater than 3000 feet 
thick. The type section is in sec 15, T.33 N., 




CONSTRUCTION AND EARLY HISTORY 
 
The Taum Sauk Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Power Plant 
was constructed from 1960-1962 and began operation in 1963.  
The lower reservoir was formed by constructing a ~60 foot 
high concrete gravity dam along the East Fork of the Black 
River ~3 miles upstream of Lesterville, MO.  The upper 
reservoir was sited on Proffit Mountain, approximately ~800 
feet above the lower reservoir and connected by a 7,000 foot 
long tunnel.   The upper reservoir was created by excavating 
the crest of Proffit Mountain and using the muck to construct a 
kidney-shaped rockfill dike with a maximum height of ~90 
feet.  An as-built cross section is shown in Fig. 1.  The water 
side of the embankment was lined with shotcrete and capped 
by a 10 foot high parapet wall.  The total capacity of the upper 
reservoir was about 4,600 acre-feet. 
 
Fig. 1. – North side of the breached embankment shows the 
lower three quarters was end-dumped while the upper quarter 
was placed into two sequences of rolled filling.  There does 
not appear to have been any significant effort made to 
mechanically compact the embankment because it was 
assumed to be a clean rockfill.  
 
The majority of the upper reservoir’s rockfill embankment 
appears to have been constructed through simple end dumping 
of the excavated material.  The fill was allowed to tumble 
down the side of the embankment, lying near its natural angle 
of repose.  The embankment materials were not mechanically 
compacted until the upper 16 feet of fill, which was 
compacted in four separate 4-foot thick lifts.  According to 
FERC (2006), this was the last uncompacted concrete faced 
rockfill dam constructed in the United States.  The boundaries 
between the different methods of fill placement were easily 
observed in the breached section of the embankment after the 
failure (see Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2. – North side of the breached embankment shows the 
lower three quarters was end-dumped while the upper quarter 
was placed into two sequences of rolled filling.  There does 
not appear to have been any significant effort made to 
mechanically compact the embankment because it was 
assumed to be a clean rockfill.  
 
A 350 MW powerhouse/pumping station was located at the 
southern base of Proffitt Mountain, accessed by a channel, 
excavated into the native bedrock.  This station was equipped 
with two reversible pump/turbine units of which one or both 
would operate in pumping or generation, depending on the 
power demand and available water in the reservoir.  In 1999 
the two units were upgraded to 440 MW capacity, which could 
lift up to 5,238 cfs into the upper reservoir under full head. 
 
SETTLEMENT OF THE UPPER RESERVOIR 
EMBANKMENT 
 
High rates of settlement were experienced at the upper 
reservoir during the first four and a half years of operation.  
Between 0.5 and 0.8 feet of settlement were experienced 
during this time, which correlates to 0.53% to 0.73% of the 
total embankment height, respectively.  J. Barry Cooke (1915-
2005), a member of the National Academy of Engineering, 
served as a consultant to Union Electric for the project, from 
the time of its design and many years thereafter.  In 1967 
Cooke summarized his observations about the reservoir’s 
performance in a letter to Union Electric (Cooke, 1967). 
Cooke felt that the average settlement rate of over 0.1 ft/year 
was unprecedented, compared to other rockfill dams, but was 
acceptable.  He concluded that “The Taum Sauk Rhyolite 
Porphyry is an excellent high compressive strength rock that 
should have stabilized in its settlement.  However, the 
formation contained frequent zones of soft weathered rock, all 
of which could not have been selectively wasted” and that “I 
believe that a fill of 100% competent rock would have 
stabilized and that the percentage of weathered rock in the 
Taum Sauk is the cause.”  An example of such a weathered 
zone is shown in Fig. 20. 
 
Settlement continued up to the time of failure in December 
2005, with differential settlements approaching two feet along 
the crest of the reservoir’s parapet wall (see Fig 3).  This 
differential settlement also led to a cracking of the concrete 
lining and continual problems with leakage.  Leakage became 
so severe in 1963, only months after operations began, it 
necessitated shutdown of the facility and additional grouting 
of the reservoir floor in the northwest portion near where the 
reservoir failed in 2005 (FERC Independent Panel, 2006). 
 
 
Fig. 3. – This figure illustrates the differential settlement 
along the crest of the upper reservoir parapet wall.  Four 
segments of the parapet wall were almost two feet lower than 
their original elevation. The elevations of the breached panels 
(shown here in red) were estimated by AmerenUE after the 
failure and may not be accurate. (Data: MoDNR (2006)) 
   




INSTALLATION OF GEOMEMBRANE LINING 
 
Leakage continued to increase each year, leading to concerns 
about the stability of the dike section and the efficiency of 
pumped storage operations.  The upper reservoir was losing 
about two feet, or about 110 acre feet or water, to seepage 
each day (Tomich and Leiser, 2006).  Some of this water was 
collected in small ponds and pumped back into the upper 
reservoir to retain efficiency. 
 
Geosynthetics Inc. (GSI) was contracted to line the upper 
reservoir in 2004 at a cost of ~$2.4 million in an attempt to 
reduce this leakage.  GSI supervised the placement of 1.3 
million square feet of 80 mil high density polyethylene 
(HPDE) textured geomembrane and geocomposite material.   
They also covered five rock outcroppings on the inboard side 
slopes with 80 mil textured linear low density polyethylene 
(LLDPE) material.  After the lining project was completed, 
leakage from the reservoir was reduced dramatically (see Fig. 
4).  Leakage rates dropped by an order of magnitude, from an 
average of around 50 cfs to about 5 cfs and the overall 
efficiency of the facility reached ~70% (FERC, 2004; and 
FERC, 2005). 
 
Fig. 4. – This figure from FERC’s Independent Panel of 
Consultants Report (2006) shows a gradual upward trend in 




DEREGULATION LED TO INCREASED UTILIZATION 
 
The Taum Sauk facility was operated approximately 100 days 
a year prior to deregulation of electric power markets in the 
1990’s.  Deregulation allowed utilities to sell power on the 
open or spot market at non-regulated rates to other utilities, 
increasing the value of power sold during periods of peak 
demand.  This change in the markets made it profitable to run 
the facility around 300 days a year and AmeronUE provided 
financial incentives for executives based on the profitability of 
their power generation facilities (Leonard, 2006 and Leonard, 
2007).  Increased utilization likely influenced the decision to 
upgrade the pump/turbine units in 1999, which increased the 
efficiency and profitability of the plant. 
 
 
RECOGNITION COINCIDENT WITH SERIOUS 
INSTRUMENTATION PROBLEMS 
 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
declared the Taum Sauk Plant an Engineering Milestone on 
Sept. 26, 2005.  This recognition has only been bestowed on 
~75 engineering project worldwide.  The Taum Sauk project 
was recognized for: 
 
• The plant was the largest in North America and one 
of the first of its type when it was constructed in 
1963. 
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• The plant used the largest turbine generators/pumps 
in the nation when placed in operation. 
• It was the first hydroelectric plant to be operated 
remotely (from St. Louis or the Bagnell Dam Power 
Plant), without humans onsite. 
• Its ability to re-start the power grid in the event of a 
complete blackout, as coal and nuclear plants need 
external power to re-start. 
 
Some AmeronUE employees visited the upper reservoir on 
Sunday September 25th, the day before the IEEE awards 
ceremony.  They observed water pouring over the parapet wall 
along the northwest portion of the reservoir, in an incident 
they described as resembling “Niagara Falls.”  Operators acted 
quickly to manually shut down the pumps and turn on the 
generating units to lower the reservoir.  Normally, workers 
wouldn’t have been onsite on a Sunday morning. 
 
Inspections after the September 25th overtopping revealed 
scour of the rockfill embankment up to 1 foot deep.  Wind-
whipped waves from the remnants of Hurricane Rita were 
initially assumed to have played a role in fomenting the 
overtopping, but the reservoir level was well above the normal 
freeboard maintained below the crest of the parapet wall. 
 
Media reports suggest that a second, minor overtopping 
occurred on September. 27th, one day after the plant won the 
award and two days after the initial incident.  On this occasion 
water levels were observed 4” from the top of the parapet wall 
and moisture on the land side of the parapet wall panels 
indicated minor overtopping had occurred that morning, 
however, it was not observed. 
 
According to news paper accounts (Tomich, and Hand, 2006), 
AmeronUE’s plant operator sent an e-mail to his supervisors 
on September 27th warning them about continued overtopping 
of the upper reservoir after the second overtopping incident.  
The operator stated that “Overflowing the upper reservoir is 
obviously an absolute 'NO-NO,'"  "The dam would severely 
erode and cause eventual failure of the dam…“ and “If water 
continued to spill over the top of the wall, it could cause a 
section to collapse and then it would be all down hill from 
there — literally.” 
 
Divers were summoned and they ascertained that the new 
sensor conduits had become detached from their mountings 
along the sloping concrete face of the reservoir.  Maximum 
water levels in the reservoir were re-programmed to reduce the 
operating level by two feet to provide a temporary “margin of 
error.”   Unfortunately, permanent repairs were postponed 
until regularly-maintenance the following spring (FERC Taum 
Sauk Investigation Team, 2006) to avoid an additional 
shutdown of the facility.   Fig. 5 shows a Photo taken by 
AmerenUE on Oct 5th, 2005 when the reservoir pool was 
drawn down.  This shows the sensor conduits have detached 
from their anchorages. 
 
Fig. 5. – This photo taken on October 5, 2006 by AmerenUE 
shows the gross deflection of the reservoir’s instrumentation 
array (photo from Rizzo Associates, 2006). 
 
It was assumed that the two foot adjustment would prevent the 
reservoir pool from overflowing until repairs could be 
completed 6 to 8 months hence.  The reservoir was also 
equipped with “fail safe” Warrick probes, which were 
intended to shut down the pumps automatically if the water 
level reached a pre-programmed elevation on the parapet wall.  
These probes used conductivity readings, which only activate 
when exposed to water in the reservoir.  These probes were 
intended to be a “fail-safe backup” in case the stage sensors in 
the submerged conduits failed for some reason.  If the Warrick 
probes activated, the pumping units were programmed to shut 
down immediately instead of the normal method of gradually 





The 6,562 ft long parapet wall was comprised of 111 panels, 
each about 60 feet long.  Each wall panel was designated by a 
number, between 1 and 111.  These numbers are referred to in 
the description that follow.  See Fig. 6 for locations of 




2 Tensioned Cables to 




Fig. 6. – This graphic from Rizzo Associates, Inc. (2006) 
shows panel locations where overflow and failure occurred. 
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On Wednesday December 14th, 2005, the main reservoir stage 
sensors failed to shut down the pumps feeding water into the 
upper reservoir during the closing stages of its nightly filling.  
The “fail safe” Warrick probes affixed to the parapet wall 
were not activated.  Water began pouring over the reservoir’s 
parapet wall at the four locations where the wall had 
experienced the greatest settlement (shown in Fig. 6).  Data 
recovered from the reservoir’s control system and back-
calculations indicate that the overflow likely initiated around 
5:09 AM along the northwest portion of the reservoir (in the 
vicinity of wall panel 95).  The parapet wall failed between 
panels 88 and 97, though physical evidence of overtopping 
was also observed beneath panels 100-103.  One of the turbine 
pump units had shut down prior to overtopping (this unit was 
programmed to shut down 4-6 feet below the wall crest), but 
the second unit continued to run until the depth of overflow at 
panel 95 location was over ~4.3 inches.  This pumping unit 
was programmed to shut down when the reservoir level rose to 
within 2 feet of the wall crest.  Water levels continued to rise 
until the second unit shut down.  Based on back-calculations 
from a series of reports including Rizzo Associates, Inc. 
(2006), FERC’s Independent Panel (2006), and FERC’s Taum 
Sauk Investigation Team (2006), the reservoir was likely 
within seconds of failure by the time the second pump unit 
shut down. 
 
The overflow resembled flow over a broad crested weir, with 
an extremely broad ‘V-shape’ over a distance of almost 900 
feet.  This condition would have trained more discharge 
towards the center of the settled section. 
 
The discharge passing over the parapet wall initially spilled 
onto the wall’s outboard footing, which was three feet wide.  
When the depth of overtopping exceeded 4.1 inches the lower 
nappe of the spillage would have begun spilling onto the 
unprotected embankment materials, scouring the rockfill 
beneath the wall. Post-failure observations at Panels 10-12, 
43-56, and 69-74, (which all survived) suggest that the water 
quickly scoured deep plunge pools where it poured directly 
onto the unprotected rockfill.  These materials were rapidly 
transported downslope and deposited in fans towards the toe 
of the embankment.  The plunge pool deepened itself within a 
matter of minutes, displacing the largest clasts onto the rim of 
the plunge pool.  Plunge pools normally excavate themselves 
to a depth of 1.5 times the free fall height on level ground, but 
the steep face of the rockfill dike (1.3:1, horizontal to vertical) 
may have exacerbated this situation, allowing an even deeper 
pool to develop.  This statement is based on post-failure 
observations below Panels 71-72 (shown in Figure 7).  The 
overtopping flow appears to have undermined three adjacent 
panels of the parapet wall in about six minutes, centered 
around panel 95, on the northwest side of the reservoir.  
Excerpts from a reconstructed failure sequence and 
complementary photos illustrative the failure mode (see Figs. 
8-18.). 
 
Fig. 7. – This photo taken below panels 71-72 show the deep 
plunge pool that developed and  subsequent undercutting of 
the parapet wall.  (Photo courtesy of David Hoffman). 
 
 
Fig 8. – The first figure from the reconstructed failure 
sequence shows the initiation of overtopping around 6 minutes 
prior to failure.  Water is spilling onto the 3 foot wide parapet 
wall footing and just beginning to erode crest of the 
embankment. 
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Fig 9. – This photograph shows arrows representing the 
overflow nappe once it extended beyond the 3 foot wide wall 
footing and directly onto the underlying rockfill.  The rate of 
scour and erosion increased dramatically once this occurred.  
At 5:15 AM, only six minutes after overtopping is believed to 
have initiated, the 60-foot long segment near wall panel 95 
toppled, unleashing 15 feet of flowing water over the 
remaining embankment and concrete liner (Figure 7). 
 
 
Fig 10. – This step of the reconstructed failure sequence 
illustrates the undermining of the parapet wall and rapid 
erosion of the embakment.  The wall remained standing at this 
point due to the hydrostatic load on the inclined portion of the 
wall footing and 3-dimensional effects from surrounding wall 
panels. 
 
Fig. 11. – This step portrays how the parapet wall toppled in 
vicinity of panel 95, initiating the catastrophic failure of the 
reservoir by unleashing ~15 feet of flow over the remaining 
embankment. 
 
Fig. 12. – This figure illustrates ~15 feet of water overflowing 
the embankment immediately after the failure of the parapet.  
The reinforced concrete liner behaved as a thin-crested weir 
and allowed for the formation of a deep plunge pool.  
 
 
Fig. 13. – The embankment and concrete liner are 
progressively removed by the outflow.  About one half the 
embankment remains at this stage. 
 
Photo by David Hoffman 
 
Fig. 14. – A continuation of the sequence show deepening of 
the plunge pool and ejection of large shingle blocks/boulders. 
   




Fig. 15. – The plunge pool deepens towards the foundation 
interface and outflow has exposed much of the underlying 
bedrock, which is then scoured. 
 
 
Fig. 16. – The embankment undergoes one final large collapse 
involving the concrete liner, sending one final surge down the 
slope. 
 
Fig. 17. – A small lip formed by the concrete liner armored 
the final last remnants of the embankment.  Only a small 
amount of water remained in the reservoir. 
 
 
Fig. 18. – The remnant lip as seen at the failure site. 
 
The water surged down the upper slopes of Proffit Mountain, 
stripping the land of vegetation and soil into the underlying 
bedrock, and exposing the unique geology of the reservoir’s 
foundation.  The flow was highly turbid and included rockfill, 
concrete, rebar, and the geosynthetic liner along with soil/rock 
and hundreds of trees.  The flow banked around curves with 
depths of up to 100 feet before entering the floodplain of the 
East Fork of the Black River, at Johnson’s Shut-ins State Park.  
The park was heavily damaged and filled with debris.  The 
flood waters passed through the narrow bedrock chute frmed 
by the Shut-ins and continued downstream to AmerenUE’s 
lower reservoir, where most of the discharge and debris were 
captured.  Damage downstream was limited to increased 
turbidity of the Black River from silt and other fines which 
were carried over the Lower Taum Sauk Dam. 
 
 
KEY FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE 
 
“Dirty” Rockfill Embankment 
 
After the reservoir failure, The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) and the Missouri Department of Natural 
Resources, Dam and Reservoir Safety Division (MoDNR-
GSRAD) conducted investigations into the failure.  Although 
the embankment was intended to be clean rockfill (less than 
5% passing the No. 200 sieve) an excessive amount of fine-
grained material was visually recognized in the exposed dike 
one day after the failure (Leonard, 2005).  Forensic analyses 
by FERC’s Taum Sauk Investigation Team (2006), FERC’s 
Independent Panel (2006), and by Rizzo Associates, Inc. 
(2006) confirmed a fines content of between zero and 20% in 
the exposed embankment bordering the breach (shown in Figs. 
2 and 19).  In addition, the percentage of sand sized material 
within the embankment was as great as 45% in certain 
locations, creating a far more erodable mixture than normally 
expected of clean rockfill (FERC Independent Panel, 2006).  
This problem was manifest by the unusual level of surfical 
erosion during the project’s 42 year life, from rainfall-induced 
runoff (FERC Independent Panel, 2006).  Cooke (1967) 
surmised that the dike could not have been clean rockfill 
because the observed settlement was almost an order of 
magnitude greater than those recorded on other concrete-faced 
rockfill dams (prior to 1967). 
 Fig. 19. - Close up of “dirty” rockfill exposed on lateral 
margins of the breach.  The large clasts are 10-12 inches 
diameter. 
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Weathered Material in Embankment 
 
The December 2005 outbreak flood exposed deeply weathered 
zones in the bedrock slopes of Proffit Mountain.  A seam of 
weathered rhyolite was observed beneath the breached section 
of the embankment.  The upper slopes of Proffit Mountain 
also contains a zone of deeply weathered diabase saprolite, 
which appears to be the remnant of a disintegrated dike or sill 
(see Fig. 20).  Adjacent granites and rhyolites also exhibited a 
high degree of weathering, likely from hydrothermal alteration 
associated with intrusion of the diabase.  The weathered 
diabase exhibits a soil-like texture, though retaining the rock’s 
original fabric and fracture patterns.  Core stones and remnant 
spheroidal weathering rinds are also visible. 
 
 
Fig. 20. – A zone of deeply weathered bedrock (saprolite) on 
the upper slopes of Proffit Mountain appears to have formed 
due to the disintegration of a diabase dike or sill and nearby 






Insufficient Foundation Preparation 
 
The project’s design specifications called for the 
embankment’s foundation to be stripped clean of all residuum 
and native soils before placement of the dumped rockfill.  
Remaining soils were to have been less than two inches thick 
and near saturation prior to fill placement. 
 
Post-failure investigations included exploratory drilling 
through the embankment-foundation interface to ascertain the 
character of the contact.  These borings revealed that up to 18 
inches of residual soil were not stripped off prior to placement 
of the rock fill.  Soils containing tree roots and other organic 
matter were also observed beneath the breached section of the 
embankment (see Fig. 21).  This may have contributed to the 
increased settlement and shifting of the embankment in this 
area, due to the high fines content, poor drainage, and higher 
compressibility of the un-stripped residual soil cap, as well as 
the ‘dirty’ rockfill. 
 
Fig. 21. – Residual soils, including tree roots and other 
organic matter, were observed left in place beneath the failed 
portion of the upper reservoir embankment. 
 
Weathered rhyolite was also discovered beneath the breached 
section.  This area had been over-excavated during 
construction, due to a “highly weathered zone” noticed at the 
time (FERC Taum Sauk Investigation Team, 2006).  This 
northwest corner was the lowest area of the upper reservoir 
floor, except for a small area around the circular inlet used to 
fill and drain the pool.  Additional filling was also required for 
this portion of the dike because of a natural depression in the 
flank of Proffit Mountain.  These factors necessitated that the 
dike reach its maximum volumetric cross section in the 
northwest corner of the upper reservoir.  This coincided with 
the area that also experienced some of the greatest settlement, 
over a zone about 900 feet long.  The only location with 
greater settlement was at the juncture between panels 71-72, 
but this was a very narrow zone.  The high percentage of fines 
in this portion of the dike would have exacerbated drainage 
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Issues Related to Liner Installation and Re-attachment of  
Instrumentation in 2004 
 
The upper reservoir’s monitoring system was anchored 
directly to the concrete lining prior to the fall of 2004, when it 
was replaced during installation of the HDPE geomembrane 
liner.    The sensor network was comprised of four perforated 
HDPE conduits.  The original design assumed two of the 
conduits would house pressure transducers; with another 
conduit serving as an extra; and a fourth conduit to be filled 
with concrete, to serve as ballast for all four, since they would 
be subjected to almost daily reservoir cycling.  The original 
design specified that the instrument conduit array would be 
anchored to the new HDPE liner using welded HDPE straps.  
The contractor pointed out that this design could reduce the 
expected life of the liner by creating stress concentrations 
around the attachment points, and they suggested that the 
conduits should be attached to the concrete face beneath the 
liner (Rizzo Associates, Inc., 2006). 
 
The alternative scheme used a pair of untensioned steel cables 
passing through eye bolts anchored to the concrete lining, 
above and below the HPDE lining.  For unknown reasons, it 
was also decided to dispense with the concrete-filled ballast 
conduit, so this pipe was installed as another spare, and the 
entire array was bereft of any meaningful ballast.   
 
The eye bolt scheme was then discarded in favor of 
turnbuckles, so the anchor cables could be tensioned and 
adjusted, after the array was in place and subjected to cyclic 
loading by the reservoir pool. Unfortunately, the turnbuckles 
were not locked after being tensioned, and they appear to have 
loosened themselves during cyclic loading engendered by the 
filling and emptying to the reservoir each day.  The four 
sensor conduits were attached every 20 feet with hardware 
assemblies known as unistruts.  A unistrut is a series of 
galvanized U-bolts fastened to a flat galvanized steel bracket.  
There were four U-bolts over the conduits at each unistrut 
anchor point.  The cyclic uplift loads caused by near-daily  
reservoir filling and draining gradually loosened the 
instrumentation conduit array and the conduits worked 
themselves free of their unistrut anchors.  The omission of  
ballast allowed much higher uplift forces to be realized by the 
sensor conduits, as air and water was trapped inside of them.  
The two anchor cables were unable to keep the array aligned 
because their turnbuckle anchors loosened. 
 
As the turnbuckles failed, the unistruts were subjected to 
additional cyclic stresses and began coming apart.  Once the 
four conduits were no longer attached to each other, they 
began to deform individually, instead of collectively.  Since 
the individual stiffness of the conduits was less than their 
cumulative stiffness, the failure of the unitstrut assemblies 
played an important role leading to the eventual failure of the 
instrumentation system. 
 
The base of the instrumentation array was also located 
approximately 120 feet from the 35 foot diameter glory hole 
inlet, which pumped water into the reservoir at a rate of 5,238 
cfs.  Vortices associated with this concentration of flow in and 
out of the inlet may have induced local currents and 
engendered traction forces on the lower unistrut anchors, in 
addition to the reservoir cycling.  It is believed that sensor 
readings were erroneously low, between slightly more than 3 
ft and as much as 4.2 ft, due to these problems (FERC 
Independent Panel, 2006). 
 
 
Elevation Datum/Staff Gage discrepancies introduced during 
liner installation 
 
The upper reservoir was designed to have two feet of 
freeboard between the water surface and the top of the parapet 
wall.  A staff gauge installed on the inside of the concrete 
parapet wall at Panel 58 and sloping interior reservoir face 
during construction had settled approximately one foot over 
42 years.  The old gauging system was operated relative to this 
staff gage at Panel 58, so freeboard at the staff gage remained 
constant throughout the years, even as the gage settled.  
Unfortunately, differential settlement elsewhere around the 
reservoir was greater.  The new gauging system was operated 
in terms of absolute elevation, which was one foot higher than 
the elevations stated on the staff gage.  This resulted in a one 
foot reduction of absolute freeboard, and, thereby, lowered the 
margin of error against overtopping. 
 
 
Error in Location and Programming of “Fail Safe” Probes 
 
The upper reservoir’s “fail-safe” Warrick probes, which were 
intended to shut down inflow whenever the reservoir rose to 
within 2 feet of crest failed to activate after the overtopping 
initiated, and were unable to save the structure.  These probes 
were located on the parapet wall at Panel 58, ABOVE the 
lowest points along the parapet wall at four other locations 
around the reservoir.  FERC’s Taum Sauk Investigation Team 
(2006) states that the two Warrick probes were at elevations 
1597.4 ft (Hi probe) and 1597.67 ft (Hi-Hi probe), 
respectively.  The lowest point along reservoir’s parapet wall 
was at panel 72, with a crest  elevation of 1597.0 ft., below 
both Warrick probes  (FERC Independent Panel, 2006).  
Although panel 95 was destroyed in the failure, its crest had 
an estimated height 1597.25 ft. (Rizzo Associates, Inc., 2006), 
also below the Warrick probes.  The auto-stop probes failed to 
activate during the two overtopping incidents in late 
September and this fact appears to have been overlooked prior 
to the Dec 14th failure.  The Warrick probes were kept as high 
as possible to prevent false alarms and shut downs, due to 
wind-whipped waves, but were mistakenly placed well above 
the lowest points on the parapet wall.  These could easily have 
been moved to lower elevations on the parapet wall at panel 
#58. 
  
The probes were also programmed with a one minute delay 
before alarms would sound and the pumps would shut down 
(FERC Independent Panel, 2006 and FERC Taum Sauk 
Investigation Team, 2006).  This delay would have allowed 
between 0.75 and 1.5 inches of additional water to be pumped 
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into the reservoir, depending if one or both pumping units 
were running at the time.  (FERC Taum Sauk Investigation 
Team, 2006). 
 
The Warrick probes were also programmed to operate in series 
instead of in parallel, which only triggered the auto-stop 
system to activate if both probes had been activated for the 
programmed time (60 seconds).  Although the Hi limit probe 
was located 4.92 inches above the lowest point along the crest 
of the parapet wall, it could have kept an additional 3.6 inches 
of water from flowing over the wall, provided that the probes 
had been programmed in parallel and with a 10 second delay 
(FERC Taum Sauk Investigation Team, 2006). 
 
Although it did not play a role in the failure, an additional  
programming error was uncovered during the post-failure 
investigations.  The Programmable Logic Controller at 
pumping unit 2 had been mistakenly programmed so that it 
couldn’t read input from either of the Warrick probes (FERC 
Taum Sauk Investigation Team, 2006).   Pumping unit 2 had 
already shut down normally prior to water levels reaching the 
Hi limit probe, but unit 1 continued to pump, resulting in the 
failure.  Had the Warrick probes been positioned below the 
lowest point(s) along the crest of the parapet wall and 
programmed with a proper delay, this error could have 
resulted in an identical failure had pumping unit 2 been set to 
shut down last.   
 
Water may have reached as high as 1597.7 feet due to the 
combination of the excessively high probe elevation, the 
programming of the probes to operate in series, and the 
programmed one minute delay in their activation (FERC 





AmerenUE had no formalized oversight to oversee 
modifications to the reservoir’s instrumentation and 
documentation on such changes was lacking to non-existent.  
There was also no formalized procedure to test such changes 
to insure they were properly implemented.  Nor was there any 
documentation rationalizing the decision to program the 
probes in parallel or with a 60 second delay (FERC Taum 
Sauk Investigation Team, 2006).   
 
The reservoir was routinely filled to within 1 foot of the 
parapet wall crest, providing an exceeding low margin of 
error, as compared to other pumped storage facilities in the 
United States (which usually operate with freeboards between 
3 and 5 feet).  This low margin of error was exacerbated by 
differential settlement of the parapet wall, which allowed four 
other zones to be about a foot lower than assumed by the plant 
operators (FERC Independent Panel, 2006). Visual oversight 
of the pumped storage operations were recommended by 
Cooke (1967) and initially implemented by Union Electric 
soon thereafter (Weldy, 1968).  Sometime between 1968 and 
the failure in 2005, visual oversight was discarded as being an 
unnecessary precaution by the operators (probably, because 
there hadn’t been any safety incidents of note until the Niagara 
Falls incidents in September 2005). The absence of visual 
inspections meant that the deterioration of freeboard (due to 
progressive creep displacement of the instrumentation 
conduits) was not noticed until the first overtopping incident 
on September 25, 2005. At this juncture the actual water levels 
should have been “ground truthed,” or compared with the 
levels being reported by the reservoir’s instrumentation 
(FERC Independent Panel, 2006).  Instead, it was assumed 
that increasing the freeboard by three feet would provide an 
adequate margin of error to account for the instrumentation 
problems. 
 
A retrospective review of the reservoir stage records suggests 
that something was awry with the instrumentation because it 
repeatedly shows water levels that do not make sense, based 
on the conditions prior to the failure.  Some examples include: 
1) the water level within the reservoir not rising when both 
pumping units were on; 2) the level rising 1 foot in 20 minutes 
with both pumping units on (it should have reported a 2.5 foot 
rise), and, 3) a 1.9 foot decrease in the reservoir level with 
both pumps operating.  The system was not programmed to 
report or flag abnormal inflow rates to alert plant operators 
although it was recorded in the facility’s computers (FERC 
Taum Sauk Investigation Team, 2006). 
 
 
IMPACTS OF THE FAILURE 
 
During the spring 2006 and 2007 legislative sessions the 
Missouri governor and state legislature considered revising 
their dam safety act (initially adopted in 1977, but not funded 
until 1981) to improve inspection and maintenance of dams 
deemed to be a danger if they were to fail (e.g. lying above 
populated areas).  Some legislators from rural counties and 
agricultural areas worried about increased costs associated 
with regulations so they voted against the bill, defeating the 
measure.  
 
AmerenUE examined its internal policies and pledged to make 
changes in its operating and maintenance procedures to 
prevent future problems.  A full-time dam safety officer has 
been hired to oversee all hydropower-related projects within 
the company.  This official has been given the authority to 
shut down any hydropower facility due to safety concerns.  
His authority supersedes other decision makers in the 
company’s chain of command. 
 
AmerenUE is paying for 100% of the clean-up and repair at 
Johnson’s Shut-ins State Park.  FERC has approved 
AmerenUE’s plan to rebuild the upper reservoir and the utility 
has expressed a desire to resume operations at the facility, 
which still holds a valid FERC permit.  The utility is involved 
in a lawsuit and investigation by the Missouri Attorney 
General’s office.  In November 2007 another suit was filed 
against AmeronUE by the Great Rivers Environmental Law 
Center alleging that FERC has failed to properly monitor the 
reconstruction project.  Both of these suits have slowed the 
approval process.  AmeronUE hopes to reconstruct the upper 
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reservoir using a roller compacted concrete (RCC) 
embankment with a spillway discharging over the eastern side 
of Proffit Mountain, onto uninhabited lands that the utility 
owns and controls, in a direction away from Johnson’s Shut-in 
State Park.  Additional measures will also be undertaken to 
reduce the risk of overtopping. 
 
 
RECORD FINE BY FERC 
 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission fined AmerenUE 
$15 million; the largest fine ever accessed by the agency and 
is 30 times larger than the previous record fine of $500,000.  
FERC assessed its record fine based on the following aspects 
(FERC, 2006): 
• Failure to report the Sept. 25, 2005 overtopping to 
FERC 
• Failure to report unusual instrument readings on Sept. 
27th 
• Failure to report the release of the transducer 
retention system 
• Addition of 0.4 feet to the water level in the 
programmable logic controller to compensate for 
inaccurate readings 
• Failure to repair the loose transducers 
• Operation of the reservoir with insufficient freeboard  
• Fail-safe probes moved to an elevation higher than 
the lowest point on the reservoir parapet wall 
• System programmed to have a 1 minute delay in 
pump shutdown after activation of probes 
• Probes reprogrammed to operate in series instead of 
in parallel 
• Lowest of two probes not programmed to sound 
alarm when activated 
 
All of the listed modifications to the facility required 




DISASTER COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH WORSE 
 
The results from this failure could have been far worse had it 
occurred at a different time of year.  Hundreds of unsuspecting 
campers would easily have perished in the state park 
campground had the failure occurred just six months later, on 
a busy summer weekend.  The timing of the overtopping 
failure towards the end of its nightly filling cycle (around 5:15 
AM) would have caught campers in their tents and 
recreational vehicles, and seasonal park staff in their nearby 
cabins.  Fortunately, the campground was empty during the 
middle of December, resulting in no deaths and just five 






PRIMARY FACTORS CAUSING THE FAILURE AND 
LESSONS LEARNED 
 
Although multiple factors contributed to the disaster, these 
might never have culminated in a catastrophic failure had a 
conventional spillway system been included in the original 
design, or a subsequent retrofit.  Everyone in the chain of 
corporate decision making seemed to assume that the three 
foot adhoc adjustment to the reservoir stage levels would 
easily account for any deficiencies for another 6+ months of 
operation, without quantifying the actual errors or verifying 
the failure mechanisms causing the erroneous readings.  The 
two Niagara Falls incidents should have triggered more in-
depth investigations and assessments of the problem, not to 
mention reports of the incidents and investigations to FERC.    
Any engineered system is capable of malfunctioning for an 
array of reasons, including aging and/or unforeseen 
circumstances.  Many of the facility’s shortcomings were 
adroitly pointed out in the first FERC peer review in 1967 
(Cooke, 1967). 
 
The impact of the differential settlement of the dike should 
have been appreciated by whoever was responsible for 
reservoir stage instrumentation.  The dike is only as “high” as 
its lowest elevation; not the crest elevation where the 
instruments are located.  Aging impacts are some of the most 
difficult to appreciate and/or anticipate, especially, if they 
have never been encountered previously by the personnel 
charged with making operational decisions.   
 
The change orders allowing the instrument conduits to be 
affixed to the unistrut anchors without any ballast would not 
have faired well had they been subjected to external peer 
review. This is because pumped storage projects are subject to 
much more severe load cycling than conventional storage 
facilities. Last minute connection details often prove to be 
problematic. Hidden design and construction flaws can often 
cause unforeseen difficulties with operation and maintenance 
throughout the life of a reservoir. 
 
The overflow incident on September 25th and 27th should have 
triggered an active monitoring program at the very least, to 
ascertain whether the problem was worsening with each cycle 
of filling. 
 
In conclusion, the principal contributing factors appear to have 
been a series of errors in human judgment.  It is estimated that 
only six minutes of malfunction fomented the catastrophe.  
Once the sensor problem was identified, a worker could have 
been hired to observe the reservoir level during the few critical 
minutes when the reservoir was topping off its nightly refill.  
Critical engineering systems with the ability to endanger life, 
property, and the environment should employ sufficient 
redundancy to survive the failure or malfunction of any single 
component, without suffering a catastrophic failure.  The 
Warrick gages affixed to the parapet wall were intended to 
provide such a “fail safe” backup.  
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As in the case of most systems failures, this project could have 
benefited immeasurably from periodic external peer review by 
a mixed panel comprised of people with substantive 
experience with the operation of pumped storage projects; 
with particular reference to the instrumentation scheme.   
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